One of the most persistent and pernicious myths of the Napoleonic wars is that squares were imobile and any attempt at movement would through them into the utmost disorder.

This article by George Nafziger and Jean Lochet shows us that this is not the case and may help to put to rest this particular myth. The article first graced the pages of Empires, Eagle and Lions in Series 2, Issue #13 July-August 1995 and is reprinted here with the kind permission of Mr. Nafziger.

Mr. Nagziger is a renowned author and has published many works on various topics of the Napoleonic Wars. His works can be found on his website: The Nafziger Collection. His opus on tactics and drill, Imperial Bayonets: Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion, and Brigade as Found in Contemporary Regulations, contains many more details on the intricacies of formations and maneuver on the Napoleonic battlefield. A review of the book can be found here.

On Squares and Attack Formations

by Jean A. Lochet and George Nafziger

Part 1: On Napoleonic Squares

by G. F. Nafziger

The square was the universal anticavalry formation. Each nation formed it according to the requirements of its battalion organization.

The French Règlement de 1791 set the formation of the square with three ranks on each face. When forming square it was done by divisions and a column was formed at the distance de peloton, or the length of a peloton formed in line. The first division did not move, the last division did an about face and the center pelotons swung out to the right or left to form those faces of the square.

The tactical history of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars is filled with a multitude of comments about infantry forming squares. Its use is very straight forward and there is really very little question about its use.

There are, however, a few minor questions that need to be answered. The first question is the man euverability and speed at which a square could be marched.

In his description of an attack at Geisberg, Girardon ¹ states that the Chaumont Battalion moved on to an open plain in column by peloton, until it was just below Geisberg. At that time it formed itself into square, because the terrain was open and the threat of cavalry significant. It was joined by the 2/33^rd Line Regiment, which also formed in square on the left of the Chaumont Battalion. Together the two battalions "charged" the enemy with bayonets, deployed the battalions (into line) and moved across the plateau at the pas de charge striking two Austrian battalions. The French continued the pursuit, probably in line as no reference was made to any formation change til they arrived before the Geisberg Chateau, where they reformed their line. This means that the charge was possibly made in square not column or line.

Also, if this maneuver could be made by a revolutionary battalion, there is no reason why it could not have been done by any regular, line infantry formation during the entire period. The probability of it being done very frequently, open to however, is discussion.

The battle of Lützen in 1813 provides a good example of several uses of the square. It should be remembered that the French were, in the spring of 1813, desperately were short of cavalry and under constant threat by allied cavalry.

As Marmont advanced onto the battlefield towards Pegau he acted in accordance with Napoleon's instructions. He advanced his forces in nine colunms on several lines, ready to form square instantly and advancing in echelon. The 20^th Division crossed Starsiedel at the pas accéléré ² with Bonnet's 21^st Division en echelon to the left and Friederich's 22 Division in the rear.

Marmont's corps was attacked by Prussian cavaliy, which surprised his forces. The 37^th Légère Regiment, formed square, but broke and fled in terror. The 1^st Marine Artillery Regiment, outfitted as an infantry regiment, formed in squares to the east of Starsiedel, when it was charged by the Brandenburg Cuirassier Regiment. Though the Brandenburgers had caused the 37^th Légère Regiment to break, the 1^st Marines repelled them easily. Perhaps the surprise of the attack had worn off and the 1^st Marines had enough time to set their square.

Marmont withdrew Compan's 20^th Division to the edge of Starsiedel and formed his forces into several squares, so that any new attack would not throw them into the same disorder that had struck the 37^th Légère Regiment. These squares were placed so close that they could not fire unless the enemy cavalry actually passed between them.

Also at Lützen we have an instance of how difficult terrain was handled by units marching in square. Around 3:00 p.m., the IV Corps was advancing slowly towards Pobles and the crossing of the Grünabach. Facing it was Wint- zingerode's Russians, who occupied the east bank of the Grünabach stream.

Though faced with enemy artillery, the French were advancing in square because of the cavalry threat. Under the cover of the French guns, Morand's 12^th Division separated into columns, crossed the stream, and reformed itself into squares to resume its advance.

There is an instance of a Confederation of the Rhine formation using squares with the IV Corps which is also enlightening and should be considered when reviewing the use of squares.

Two Hessian regiments were moving against Klein-Görschen. The Hessian Leib-Garde Regiment formed into square and advanced against Klein- Görschen. The Leib Regiment moved in the second line to the left and the Fusiliers moved on the extreme left, formed in column and covering the whole advance. The force was covered by a screen of Hessian skirmishers and a redoubled artillery fire in support.

The attack advanced at the sturmschritte (storming pace) to seize the bridge to Klein-Görschen. Here, we have infantry both attacking and advancing at the sturmschritte, which was the Hessian equivalent of the pas de charge! The square was obviously not slower than any other formation, despite modern thought on that point.

In another discussion, Colin presents column tactics which Schauenbourg trained his division to use. At least twice in major exercises, Schauenbourg had his division convert from a line of battalions into a massive, four sided square. These formations bear very strong similarities to Macdonald's Wagram column as well (see below). However, the intended use of these squares is not clear. Schauenbourg's notes do not indicate if this formation was intended as a defense against cavalry or if they were intended for other, unnamed purposes.

In one example of a massive square formed by battalions in lieu of companies, the line folded back into a square with each battalion marching backwards to the required depth, performing a perpendicular turn towards the center and marching to its final position. The front of the square was formed by battalions that retained their initial position. The rear was formed by the flank battalions marching directly to the rear, halting at the prescribed distance, turning inwards and marching in a line to their final position. This is much like the very deploying of a line into an attack column.

In a second maneuver Schauenbourg used a system of folding the line on the center much like the Prussians used to form square from line under the directions of the 1788 regulation. The line folded on the center battalions, much as in the previous example. However, the French battalions marched independently of one another, in great sweeping movements towards their final position.

This type of maneuver may seem very theoretical until one realizes that it is essentially the formation that Macdonald employed at the battle of Wagram. There are also other examples of this type of formation being used, though Macdonald's is the most famous.

The French infantry also formed regimental squares. These were large and more complex affairs that provided a maximization of firepower while retaining the integrity of the square formation. These types of square formations were used at Lützen, Borodino and Weissenfels. However, these formations were not made in immediate response to an attack by cavalry, but were, at least for Lützen and Weissenfels, the formations in which the French deployed into upon reaching the battlefield.

One of the many current misconceptions ofthe square is that it was a fixed formation, barely able to move. This is not true. When the Prussians retreated off the field after their defeat at Jena-Auerstädt, their rear was a Saxon grenadier battalion in square. It outmarched the pursuing French infantry and held the French cavalry at bay.

In the battle ofJena, Baron Seruzier, commander of the artillery of General Morand's Division of the III Corps (Davout), states in his memoirs: "J'en étais là, quand notre division, formée en carrés d'infanterie marchant au pas de charge, parvint à notre hauteur." (which translates as: "I was there, when our Division, formed in infantry squares moving at the pas de charge, aligned itself with us" JAL). That passage states very clearly that he witnessed a French division formed in square, marching at the pas de charge (120 paces per minute), up a rise. Such a passage is rare because it specifies the march rate and the formation, but it clearly shows that the square was as mobile as other any formation.

In 1813, due to the lack of cavalry to protect it, many units of the French army marched onto the battlefield at Lützen in square. How slow could the square have truly been if it was used on a divisional scale by maneuvering armies? Obviously, the historical record shows that the formation had no impact on the speed with which a battalion could maneuver.

One reason that a square might have gained the reputation of moving at a slower rate would be if the infantry forming it was poorly trained and could not maintain formation at the higher rate of speed. It is also possible that it moved in a loose square that tightened up and set itself when cavalry approached. If cavalry was too near the infantry square might well not move very quickly so as to prevent its ranks from opening up. It would be possible, under those circumstances, for a formed square to be broken if cavalry could dash in upon it quickly enough before it closed all the gaps.

Part II. More on Squares

by ]ean A. Lochet

In mid February, George Nafziger sent me a of his latest brain child copy A Guide to Napoleonic Warfare ³ , which contains a wealth of information on tactics. The above article by George is an excerpt from that book.

From the above, it is quite clear that squares moved as fast as other formations. At CoLD WARs 95, George and I discussed at length the question of squares and their mobility and the attack of the Middle Guard at Waterloo as described by General Petit, i.e., that it was carried out in squares. But before we go back to General Petit's report let us see some other pertinent points.

On wargamers and the speed of squares

There are two kinds of wargamers. The first kind likes to play with one (or more) set(s) of rules, which may or may not be based on true Napoleonic tactics and is fairly satisfied with that. The second kind, the simulation wargamer, usually uses more sophisticated rules that, he likes to believe, are based on true Napoleonic tactics.

Both types of wargamers consider squares as slow moving formations. Most rules allow squares to move at half speed or even slower than that. Believe me, it is a firmly entrenched belief! At CoLD WARs 95, I had the opportunity to talk to several wargamers about the subject, telling them that we had concrete evidence showing that squares moved faster than that which we have been led to believe. Everyone I contacted had a very skeptical attitude and even profound disbelief... So, obviously most wargamers have a clear and definite opinion about squares: they are slow moving formations.

Yet, in all the above examples given by George Nafziger, the squares moved at regulation speeds (even at charge speed!) and there is no evidence whatsoever to support that they moved as slow as many rules impose upon it. Of course, when one professes that the Middle Guard at Waterloo attacked in squares, the reaction of most wargamers is: You have to be crazy, to attack with slow moving squares! That reaction is perfectly understandable since theybase their conclusion on the erroneous understanding that squares were slow moving formations.

The different types of squares

I don't intend to cover extensively the formations of squares but just to cover the basics. Each nation formed it according to the requirements of its battalionorganization.TheFrenchused the following procedures to form square. The French Règlement de l791 set the formation of the square on 3 ranks on each face and the same principle was retained by the Manuel d'infanterie ou résumé de tous les règlements décrets, usages et renseignements propres aux sous-officiers de cette armée. 1813. We'll skip the procedure as the diagrams are self-explanatory. Note that the adoption of the 6-company battalion in 1807 changed the French square into a rectangle.

Note that a square, although it is not mentioned in the Règlement or the Manuel d'infanterie, was formed by facing the "side" companies forward, and moving the square forward. If the square in this moving formation was threatened by cavalry,it simply stopped and faced its "two side companies" in the proper direction, i.e. facing outside. That was quickly done.

Napoleon, the French Generals and the Cavalry Menace

There are numerous accounts clearly showing the respect that Napoleon and the French generals had for cavalry. Before the Campaign of 1806, Napoleon wrote to Soult ⁶ : "It that the appears most redoubtable item about the Prussians is their cavalry; but, with the infantry you have, and by alway staking a position to form squares, you have little to fear. However, no means of war must neglected..." So, in essence, Napoleon simply said to Soult, a most able tactician, to be careful about the Prussian cavalry and be always ready to form square. Soult was a very careful tactician and had great respect for cavalry. That is well illustrated by the specific instructions sent before the battle of Austerlitz by Soult to his Divisional commanders ⁷ :

"The divisional generals were expressly urged to retain the formation of two lines of battle and one of light infantry, and to keep the battalions in columns of divisions, at platoon intervals, so they could operate with greater speed, while being able at any time to form square against cavalry. This arrangement was maintained throughout the action, and if some battalions deployed, it was only to present a greater extent of front to the enemy."

Note that with such a formation shown in Diagram 3, that Soult's Divisions could form interlocking, mutually supporting squares very quickly. (Soult's battalions in columns of divisions at platoon intervals could form squares quickly by a maneuver similar to that of Diagram 1.)

The very same cautious instructions to deploy his infantry in two lines had been ordered by Lannes and forming mutually interlocking squares in two lines proved to be a decisive factor in repelling the Allied cavalry. Many identical examples can be found in reliable sources.

The French Imperial Guard and squares

The French Imperial Guard infantry was organized in 4-company battalions. Each company at full strength roughly occupied a frontage of 44 yards. Like the line infantry, the Guard used the line, the column of companies and the square, as per the Règlement of 1791. The square could be formed from the line or from the column of companies, (or other columns) as shown in the diagrams.

General Petit's squares at Waterloo could be such a formation. It could be formed from an column of open companies as shown in the diagram by wheeling the 2^nd and 3^rd companies (courtesy of George Nafziger).

It is rather obvious that a "walking" square could simply form either square by simply facing frontward the 2^nd and 3^rd companies. If cavalry attacked, both companies would simply face "outside". There is nothing complicated here and the maneuver is made according to regulations!

Such a walking square would be some 27 yards by 27 yards or so (even less with reduced effective strengths). ⁸ It is not much different from a closed column of companies, which would have been some 27 yards by about 10 yards. Not a big difference on a battlefield obscured by smoke.

Macdonald's Square at Wagram

Macdonald's formation at Wagram was covered in EE&L 3. It was the result of long studies on that formation (see EE&L 76,77 and 118).

Macdonald's formation at Wagram is worth describing. We have been told by Oman, that at Wagram, Macdonald formed a monstrous column with some 23 battalions at very reduced strength. It was formed by 8 battalions in double line, 4 battalions in columns of battalion one behind the other on the left, and 8 battalions in columns of battalion one behind the other on the right.The rear consisted of 3 battalions side by side. In his memoirs, Macdonald claims that he adopted such formation for his attack because he feared an attack by the Austrian cavalry. Following is what Macdonald says in Marshal Macdonald's Recollections, p.338. Macdonald had formed part of his Division in 2 lines of 4 battalions each. Then, he closed his first line (of 4 battalions on his second ) line (also of 4 battalions):

"...I therefore ordered four battalions, followed by four others which I deployed in two lines, to advance at the double; and while my artillery opened fire, and that of the Guard took position (which the Emperor called the hundred gun battery), my two divisions formed themselves into attacking columns. The enemy, who were still advancing, halted, and, redoubling their fire, caused us terrible damage. However, in proportion as my lines became unserviceable, I drew them up closer together, and made them dress as at drill. While I was doing this, I saw the enemy cavalry preparing to charge, and had barely time to close my second line on the first one (emphasis mine, JAL); they were flanked by two divisions still in columns, and the square was completed (emphasis mine, JAL) by a portion of General Nansouty's cavalry that had been put under my orders since the morning..."

So, as it can be seen from the above, Macdonald's formation at Wagram was neither a massive column as suggested by Oman nor ordre-mixte. Macdonald intended to form a square to repulse a threat of an Austrian cavalry charge, which materialized shortly after. The huge square was later on used as an assault formation to break through the Austrian lines and the Austrian artillery caused fearful damage to it.

Conclusion

The above should help some what to better understand the usage of squares on the battlefield. We'll be glad to receive comments (positive and negative) and answer questions from the readership.

Acknowledgment: Many of the above diagrams are reproduced (with the kind permission of George Nafziger from A Guide to Napoleonic Warfare ³ .

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